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Intentions and Cooperative Activity:
Explaining Cooperation in Light of Bratman’s Notion of 
Shared Intention
Irene Boragno1
AbstrAct
This paper focuses on one of the major controversies about the explana-
tion of collective action. The discussion revolves around the possibility of 
ascribing intentions to groups, understanding these intentions as distinct from 
the mere sum of group members’ individual intentions. In the literature on 
this subject we can identify two main lines of explanation of collective inten-
tions: one that reduces group intentions to the sum of individual intentions 
and another that appeals, through a variety of strategies, to some kind of plu-
ral subject or collective consciousness. Based on the notion of shared inten-
tion, Michael Bratman has offered an interesting and successful alternative to 
both views. My goal is to present and analyse that notion of shared intention, 
explaining why it is interesting to consider Bratman’s proposal.
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In discussions on collective intentionality there are two opposite ways 
of explaining the intention present in joint actions. On the one hand, the ag-
gregative or summative accounts, as they are usually called, understand the 
intentions of joint action as the mere sum of coincident individual intentions 
(Tollefsen, 2004). At the opposite extreme are the explanations that appeal, 
following different strategies, to a kind of plural or collective mind, attribut-
ing intentional states to such collective entities.
1 University of Málaga. E-mail: ireneboragno@gmail.com. This paper, is one of the 
outcomes of the Seminar in Ethics and Political Philosophy. The seminar is an activity of the 
project The Civic Constellation (Spanish National Research Plan, FFI2011-23388).
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The idea of shared intention proposed by Bratman (1999), as well as the 
notion of collective intention offered by Searle (1990), is an alternative to both 
types of explanations. Shared intention defines the type of interaction between 
individuals involved in what Michael Bratman calls a shared activity. But that 
intention is not the result of adding the individual intentions of the participants 
nor can it be attributed to a sort of collective mind resulting from the merger of 
participants’ minds. So on the one hand, it overcomes the difficulties of the ag-
gregative view to explain the relations among participants in joint actions, but 
on the other hand, it arouses suspicions among methodological individualists 
for appealing to something like a sort of collective consciousness.
Considering Bratman’s proposal to address the issue of collective inten-
tions it is essential to the extent that he is the author who has devoted more 
efforts to explain the role of intentions in practical reasoning, overcoming 
the traditional view of intentions in terms of desires and beliefs. The most 
important feature of Bratman’s account is the relation he establishes between 
intention and planning. And planning, as Bratman points out, is a central fea-
ture in human action.
I want to present and analyse the notion of shared intention and explain 
why it is interesting to consider Bratman’s proposal. First, I will present Brat-
man’s conception of intention and how he applies it to the cases of shared 
agency. Second, I will refer to the main features of Bratman’s account of 
shared intention. Then, I will explain the role and structure of shared inten-
tion. Finally, I will point out why Bratman’s approach is relevant, refer ring 
briefly to the relation between shared intention and cooperation.
IntentIon And Its role In PrActIcAl reAsonIng
Intention is, according to Bratman (1987), the minimum unit of planning, 
namely, the smallest element of partial plans that are subject to rational pres-
sures of consistency and coherence. As desire, intention is a motivational 
intentional state in the action. But, understood in relation to planning, inten-
tion is subject to rational pressures, which is not the case of desire. According 
to those rational pressures, intention has a controlling function of the action 
(1987, 15-17):
First, intention involves a special commitment to the execution of the ac-
tion. Second, intention plays an important role in coordinating our various 
intentional states. So, once we form an intention, it constrains the rest of the 
intentions we can form afterward. And third, the two previous points are pos-
sible in part because of the tendency to stability that characterises intention, 
which shows resistance to be reconsidered. This allows Bratman to affirm 
that intention unifies our individual agency so that it remains coherent and 
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consistent over time. Intention coordinates what I am going to do now with 
what I plan to do later.
IntentIon In shAred Agency
In Faces of Intention (1999) Bratman tries to develop and expand his plan-
ning theory of intention (Bratman, 1987), designed for the case of individual 
action, to cases in which we act together, and he does so exploring the notion 
of shared intention.
A central idea in Bratman’s works is that human agency is characterised 
by two facts. On the one hand, it is a temporally extended agency as our ac-
tions spread over time. On the other, we are social agents and our actions are 
related to other agents’ behaviour. Taking into account these two aspects, 
intrapersonal and interpersonal coordination are presented as key elements in 
practical reasoning. In fact, the characteristic feature of Bratman’s explana-
tion of shared intentions is the analogy he draws between intrapersonal coor-
dination and interpersonal coordination. He presents a close parallel between 
his theory of intention in the case of individual action and its view of inten-
tions in joint action. If individual intentions control and coordinate our agency 
insofar as it develops in time, a shared intention does the same when we act 
with other agents. That is to say, shared intention encourages coordination not 
only between my own actions along different points in time, but also between 
actions of different agents involved in a shared activity.
Bratman explains and develops his conception of shared intention focus-
ing on the simplest cases of shared agency, that is, what he understands as 
instances of modest or moderate sociality (2009, 150). These are small-scale 
cases of intentional shared agency characterised by the absence of asymmetric 
authority relations. It should be noted before proceeding that the author dis-
tinguishes between shared intentional activity and shared cooperative agency. 
The first involves a shared intention along with associated forms of mutual 
responsiveness. In contrast, shared cooperative activity also requires the ab-
sence of certain types of coercion and the commitment to mutual support in 
the execution of the joint action (1999, 9). But in both cases the interaction 
and the coordination necessary for successful execution of the action are pos-
sible due to a shared intention and its role in practical reasoning.
two InItIAl constrAInts
Bratman considers two constraints in his explanation of shared intention, 
placing his approach midway between aggregative views and those appeal-
ing to collective entities. As Bratman himself acknowledges, his account of 
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shared intention “is individualistic in spirit” (1999, 129). Accordingly, the 
first constraint is that shared intention is not an attitude that may be assigned 
to any sort of super agent. Thus, intention in shared actions cannot be charac-
terised in terms of its subject. In the case of shared activity intentions remain 
individual, as in the case of individual action. Despite this and according to 
the second constraint, Bratman considers that aggregative views of shared or 
collective intentions are not enough to understand shared actions. He rejects 
from the beginning that a shared intention is the sum of coincident individual 
intentions. Such criticism of aggregative views relies on the observation that 
the fact that two agents intend to do p does not guarantee in any way that they 
intend to do p together. This requires a certain interrelationship between in-
tentions of the various agents involved. This failure can be seen more clearly 
by the following example. Suppose that two co-workers, A and B, are taking 
the bus together to go to their office. At the same time, another employee, C, 
is also taking the bus to the same place. From a merely aggregative view we 
cannot explain what distinguishes the relationship between the actions of A 
and B from the relationship between the actions of A and C. Just everyone has 
a coincident intention: to go by bus to the office. However, there is no doubt 
that both relationships are not equal. We say that A and B are doing something 
together. Instead, we can only say that there is a coincidence between what A 
and C are doing.
Given this, Bratman tries to provide an account of intentions in shared 
activity, which does not attribute intentions to any collective entity and that 
addresses the interrelationships between the agents involved.
the notIon of shAred IntentIon
Bratman proposes to understand the meaning of shared intention as a set 
of individual intentions that meets the following features:
1.  Individual intentions that make up the whole are interrelated in a spe-
cific way.
2.  Individual intentions forming the shared intention have a special con-
tent, which includes a reference to an action that is performed not only 
by the intention’s subject, but also by other agents.
3.  None of the intentions of the individuals involved is in itself a shared 
intention.
The first feature undoubtedly reflects the attempt to overcome the short-
comings of purely aggregative visions and thereby explains the difference 
between shared intention and coincident intentions. The second feature is pre-
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cisely what makes possible the interrelationship between participants’ inten-
tions to which the first one makes reference. According to this second feature, 
the content of individual intentions must refer to an action performed by all 
participants, not just by the intention’s subject. This can present certain prob-
lems. It contradicts a principle that Bratman calls the own-action condition, 
and that is widely accepted in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of ac-
tion (2008, 2). Under this condition, the content of an intention can only refer 
to an action whose realization depends on the proper subject of the intention. 
That is, in the content of my intentions I can only include my own actions. 
Finally, according to the third feature, none of the individual intentions that 
make up the shared intention constitutes by itself a shared intention. This can 
explain the very fact that Bratman uses “shared intention” in the singular and 
not “shared intentions”.2 In a shared intentional activity there is one shared 
intention, not several shared intentions of the different individual agents. A 
shared intention is not a special kind of intention that is entirely repeated in 
each of the participating agents. No individual alone can have a shared inten-
tion. Considering the very meaning of the term “share”, the presence of two 
agents who share the intention it is at least necessary.
the role of shAred IntentIon
Bratman’s central argument to defend his notion of shared intention is 
that, as he defines it, shared intention plays in practical reasoning of shared 
agency a similar role to that which individual intention plays in the practical 
reasoning of individual agency. According to the coordinating role attributed 
to individual intention, Bratman breaks down the role of shared intention into 
the following three points. If you and I intend to do x, our shared intention 
exert control over our behaviour:
1.  By helping to coordinate our actions in this way targeting the goal of 
our cooperative action.
2.  This is made, to a great extent, ensuring that our sub-plans on how to 
do x are coordinated and compatible.
3.  By providing, thanks to its stability feature, a relatively fixed back-
ground framework that structures our negotiation about how to do x.
Established the analogy between individual intention and shared inten-
tion, Bratman tries to explain two things. First, what is the structure of shared 
2 It contrast with espressions such as “we-intentions” used by R. Tuomela and K. Miller 
(1988) or with “collective intentions” in Searle (1990).
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intention, namely, what kind of relationship and what kind of content should 
characterise a set of individual intentions identifiable as a shared intention. 
And secondly, he explains how a network of individual intentions like that 
can fulfil the functions attributed to shared intention.
two PotentIAl dIffIcultIes
But before explaining these points, the author proposes to attend to two 
preliminary considerations. The first indicates a potential risk of circularity if 
our account of shared intention appeals to a kind of joint action involving in 
itself the presence of a shared intention (1999, 114). Bratman tries to avoid 
it by limiting its analysis to neutral types of joint action concerning shared 
intention. For example, there is a clear sense in which we can travel together 
by train without a shared intention.
The second consideration is whether I may intend that we do p. That is, 
how the content of my intention can refer to some activity that is not entirely 
under my control or that does not depend only on me? As explained above, in-
cluding such a thing in the content of an intention violates the so-called prin-
ciple of self-own action (2008, 2), but Bratman rejects this condition. First, he 
underscores the difference in English between attempt and intent, which do 
not have the same constraints in their content (1999, 97). If intention is not 
identified with attempt, but with the minimum element of a plan, we can be 
more permissive about their contents. The planning conception of intention 
allows us to understand that my conception of our doing p plays the same role 
in my plans than my conception of my own doing p in the case of individual 
action. In both cases we are faced with problems and rational demands of 
consistency and coherence. Furthermore, regarding the objection that if “I 
have the intention that we do x” the content of the intention is not under my 
control, Bratman says that his proposal is compatible with the construction of 
a condition of influence accordingly: to be the case I intend that we p, I need 
to see your execution of p in some way under my influence (1999, 116).
the structure of shAred IntentIon
To sum up, Bratman wants to show that a set of individual attitudes with 
certain contents and interrelated in a special way can support the coordination 
aimed at a common goal –the coordination that characterizes a shared inten-
tional activity. This set does it in part by ensuring the coordination of sub-
plans and providing a framework for negotiation. Fulfiling that role, this truss 
can be identified with a shared intention. But what is the relationship between 
individual intentions that make the shared action possible? To answer this 
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question Bratman analyses four possible visions of shared intention, and their 
respective counter-examples. Considering these four views, he starts from the 
simplest model, which coincides with a merely aggregative view, to get to the 
most complex which, according to Bratman, will best explain the features of 
shared intention.
The proposed initial condition is as follows. Two agents A and B have a 
shared intention to do x if and only if:
1)  A intends that A and B do x, B intends that A and B do x. These inten-
tions matching the content of A and B, while necessary, are insufficient 
to ensure a cooperative action. For example, both can have intended to 
go together from the airport to downtown, not knowing that the other 
also has that intention. Hence it is impossible that it produces a joint 
action.
Therefore Bratman adds another condition:
1)  A intends that A and B do x, and B intends that A and B do x.
2)  1 is mutually known.
But there is a counter-example that shows that these two conditions do not 
ensure the presence of a shared intention and coordination that makes it pos-
sible. A and B may intend to go together to downtown, but it is possible that 
each of them can intend to kidnap the other. Even if it is mutually known, it 
does not guarantee cooperation because they do not want to coordinate their 
own actions with the successful execution of the other’s intention to direct 
them to a common goal. Rather they want to hinder the ability of the other 
to act intentionally. In response to this counter-example, Bratman adds a new 
condition:
1)  1.a) A intends that A and B do x, 1.b) B intends that A and B do x.
2)  A intends that A and B do x according to 1.a and 1.b; B intends that A 
and B do x according to 1.a and 1.b.
3)  1 and 2 are mutually known.
But so far, these conditions only ensure that every participant has an 
individual plan in which the intention of each participant to do together 
x is effective. But it does not ensures that each participant has the inten-
tion that the various sub-plans on how to do x are jointly coordinated and 
consistent. Of course, there is a shared conception of x. However, there is 
no doubt that differences about how to make x could prevent the necessary 
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coordination for cooperative action. Therefore Bratman introduces a final 
requirement:
1)  1.a) A intends that A and B do x, 1.b) B intends that A and B do x.
2)  A intends that A and B do x according to 1.a and 1.b and the subplans 
1a and 1b are coordinated; B intends that A and B do x according to 1.a 
and 1.b and the subplans of coordinated 1a and 1b.
3)  1 and 2 are mutually known. 
Bratman makes two observations about the necessary coordination of the 
relevant sub-plans for cooperative action:
First, it is not necessary that the sub-plans are completely overlapping, 
only that they are embedded or coordinated. This simply means that one can 
find a way to do x that does not violate the sub-plans of any participants, but 
involves rather the successful execution of them.
Second, it is not necessary to A and B come to have a shared intention 
that they have already their subplans fully coordinated in the manner just 
described. Part of this will happen after having a shared intention. In fact, we 
can be involved in negotiations on how to do x as we begin to do x. It is in 
this latter case, when we continue negotiating and having already the shared 
intention, the situation in which is clearly shown how the shared intention 
provides a relatively fixed frame structure for negotiation. Thus, the network 
of individual attitudes characterised by conditions 1, 2 and 3 makes it pos-
sible to coordinate actions and subplans and allows negotiation about how to 
pursue a shared goal. Therefore, performing the same function in cooperative 
action as the shared intention, this network can be identified with it.
the relevAnce of brAtmAn’s ProPosAl
Bratman’s proposal should be considered as an essential contribution to 
the explanation of collective intentionality and agency for at least three rea-
sons. First, his account recognizes our attributions of intentionality to a group 
of individuals acting together, giving meaning to those attributions. So he 
does not reduce them to a mere rhetorical use of language, nor takes them for 
a wrong use. And it does not contradict the basic principles of methodological 
individualism that, as noted by Noguera (2003), functions as a kind of anti-
metaphysical corrective in the social sciences. However, Bratman’s account 
does not present the problems commonly attributed to individualistic expla-
nations of collective phenomena, ignoring for example the interrelationships 
between the various individual intentional states that are part components of 
these phenomena.
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Second, Bratman’s proposal is an excellent opportunity to examine the 
relationship between normativity and practical rationality in the case of joint 
action, taking into account the rational pressures present in intention, both 
individual and shared. A major criticism of Bratman’s approach is that he does 
not explain the normative relations present in shared or cooperative action 
(Gilbert, 2000, 156). For example, he does not enter into the description of the 
shared action itself any promise or obligation according to which, if I do not 
fulfil my part of the joint action, the other has a right to complain. Bratman 
holds that unconditional promises and obligations are not necessary condi-
tions to be included in the explanation.
Certainly, in the formation of a shared intention, or in the negotiation 
about the subplans, we may make promises expressing obligations to others. 
As a consequence, breaching these promises confers on others the right to 
complain. But all this is not an essential feature of shared intention or shared 
activity.
However, even without any promises, we can say that, if A and B have a 
shared intention to go together to downtown, A must do his part. But for that 
judgment it is not necessary to have a promise linked to a shared intention. 
That A must do his part of joint action is definitely a normative judgment, but 
whose normativity does not derive from any moral norm. That normativity is 
derived from a rational commitment, a commitment with the execution of our 
own intentions, as in the case of individual intentions. Therefore, Bratman’s 
approach reminds us that the scope of normativity is broader than the realm 
of morality, and moral norms are not the only source of normative judgments 
about our behaviour, in this case about our interaction with others to act to-
gether.
Finally, Bratman’s proposal presents an overview of the joint action less 
idealised than usual. It permits differences in the reasons why we intend to do 
x, and accordingly with this, it also permits differences of bargaining power 
between agents. In addition, sub-plans on how to do x do not have to be com-
pletely consistent; they only have to be coordinated. Supporting the other’s 
execution of its part of x is a matter of rationality, not necessarily a matter 
of meeting a moral standard according to which we must keep our promises. 
With this less idealised view of joint action, Bratman makes an interesting 
contribution to the explanation of collective action.
Despite such advantages, Bratman’s proposal presents some difficulties 
concerning how to understand the relationship between shared intention and 
cooperation. When we refer to activities carried out by more than one indi-
vidual we think almost directly about cooperation. But in Bratman’s work on 
shared intention and shared activity, it is not easy to find a clear relationship 
between shared intention and cooperation. On the one hand, when he de-
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scribes the interaction characterising what he calls shared cooperative activ-
ity, the definition of that interaction is nearly coincident with his definition 
of shared intention. On the other hand, at the beginning of his book Faces of 
Intention (1999, 9) the author points out the difference between two kinds of 
shared activity: shared intentional activity and shared cooperative activity. 
This distinction seems to be at least problematic because it is not clear how an 
action carried out by several individuals can be possible without cooperation. 
Even competitive interrelations may require often some degree of coopera-
tion.
But it should be noticed that this problem, the lack of precision regard-
ing the notion of cooperation, can be found in different works on collective 
intentionality, as in the case of Searle (1990).3 Although not a matter to be 
discussed here, at least I want to point out that the concept of cooperation 
should not be taken for granted. Instead, it would be interesting and fruitful 
to examine and clarify how cooperation is understood in the discussions on 
collective intentionality and agency.
concludIng remArKs
Bratman explains intentions present in the joint action establishing an 
analogy between the functions of individual intention and the functions of 
what he calls shared intention. The last one is identified with a set of indi-
vidual intentions related in a specific way and having special contents. Ac-
cordingly, this set of individual intentions plays a crucial role in interpersonal 
coordination, typically attributed by Bratman to shared intentions.
As noted in the last section, the notion of shared intention proposed by 
Bratman is a significant contribution to the debates about collective intention-
ality. First, it provides a promising alternative to aggregative approaches and 
social holistic views. It overcomes deficiencies of the former while avoiding 
the suspicions aroused by the latter. Second, the debate about the relation-
ship between shared intention and promises is an interesting starting point 
to discuss how normativity and practical reasoning are related to each other. 
And finally, Bratman’s approach offers a less idealised view of joint action. 
While making some distinctions that may seem problematic, Bratman’s work 
on shared intention and joint action leads us to consider more carefully what 
we mean by cooperation.
3 See also Philip Cohen, Jerry Morgan and Martha E. Polack (1990), and Peter French and 
Howard Wettstein (2006).
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